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WILLIAM IAN MILLER 
Weak Legs: 
Misbehavior Before the Enemy 
STATUTES MAKE FOR APPALLINGLY TEDIOUS reading unless primi- 
tively short and to the point as, for example, this provision in the early Kentish laws 
of IEthelberht (c. 600): "He who smashes a chin bone [of another] shall pay 20 
shillings" or this one from King AElfred (c. 890): "If anyone utters a public slander, 
and it is proved against him, he shall make no lighter amends than the carving out 
of his tongue."1 Yet on very rare occasion a modern statute can rivet our attention 
and when it does it seems to do so by mimicking some of the look and feel of legisla- 
tion enacted in less lawyer-ridden times. Consider the statute presently set forth in 
the United States Code as part of the Uniform Code of Military Justice: 
MISBEHAVIOR BEFORE THE ENEMY 
Any member of the armed forces who before or in the presence of the enemy- 
(1) runs away; 
(2) shamefully abandons, surrenders, ordelivers up any command, unit, place, or mili- 
tary property which it is his duty to defend; 
(3) through disobedience, neglect, or intentional misconduct endangers the safety of 
any such command, unit, place, or military property; 
(4) casts away his arms or ammunition; 
(5) is guilty of cowardly conduct; 
(6) quits his place of duty to plunder or pillage; 
(7) causes false alarms in any command, unit, or place under control of the armed 
forces; 
(8) willfully fails to do his utmost o encounter, engage, capture, or destroy any enemy 
troops, combatants, vessels, aircraft, or any other thing, which it is his duty so to encounter, 
engage, capture, or destroy; 
(9) does not afford all practicable relief and assistance to any troops, combatants, ves- 
sels or aircraft of the armed forces . . . when engaged in battle; 
shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.2 
Making cowardice a capital offense strikes us as a kind of barbaric survival 
from a rougher age, a time, that is, when few doubted that courage ranked higher 
than pity or prudence in the scale of virtues. And if many of us today believe that 
capital punishment cannot be justified even for the sadistic torturer, what a shock 
to discover that, as an official matter at least, Congress reserves it for the person 
who cannot kill at all. Not to worry: although the state has the power and right to 
execute those who misbehave before the enemy we are too unsure of ourselves, or 
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maybe even too charitable, to enforce the statute maximally. We have done so but 
once since 1865 when Private Eddie Slovik was executed by firing squad "pour 
encourager les autres" in the bleak Hurtigen Forest of 1945.3 Still, even if only by 
inertia, we have preserved the option. 
Quite independent of the grimness of its sanctions, the statute prompts our 
attention because of its strangely absurdist quality. Most of its provisions seem 
merely to restate each other. What, for instance, is running away (1) that isn't also 
cowardly conduct (5). And aren't paragraphs 2 and 8, the one covering the shame- 
fulness of cowardice on defense, the other governing slacking off on offense, really 
special cases of cowardly conduct punished in 5? Paragraph 7 goes so far as to make 
jitteriness a capital offense to the extent one's nerves lead one to overinterpret causes 
for alarm, while paragraph 3, in contrast, authorizes putting the sleeping sentry 
before the firing squad apparently because he is not jittery enough even to stay 
awake. 
There is also the statute's strange relation with fear. All law must pay homage 
to fear, for if the law does not succeed in nurturing the passions that will make it 
self-enforcing, such as a sense of duty or a special reverence for the law as law, it 
must have recourse to fear, the passion that underwrites all coercive law fear of 
punishment or the fear of the shame of being execrated as a law breaker. But this 
statute places fear at its substantive core, for it is fear-impelled action that it mostly 
seeks to regulate. 
Only paragraph 6 the stricture against looting cares nothing about fear, 
not even the fear that you and your raping and pillaging comrades inspire in the 
enemies' civilian population as you quit your proper place to plunder. Like the other 
provisions, the antilooting provision is devoted to maintaining the delicate balance 
of forces that keep armies behaving as armies rather than as crowds. At times that 
balance is as susceptible to being undone by routing the enemy as by being routed 
by him. Success can be as disordering as failure.4 The initial success of the German 
offensive on the western front in March 1918 was stopped, say some, as much by 
the German soldiers stumbling upon stores of wine and cognac as by Allied resis- 
tance. But the weight of these strictures hows that loss of discipline and order bred 
by greed, cruelty, lust, and other manifestations of exultant riot is of significantly 
less concern than the loss of discipline bred by fear, slackness, and failure of nerve. 
Narrow self-interest in the exuberantly acquisitive style of the looter is just not as 
worrisome to an army as narrow self-interest inthe life-preserving style of the cow- 
ard. Fearfulness, not lust or gluttony, count as a soldier's first sin. 
There lurk in this strange statute various attempts at a theory of the moral and 
legal economy of courage, cowardice, duty, and fear in the context of the demands 
a polity, in this case the American polity, makes upon its combat soldiers. The expo- 
sition that follows, structured mostly as a gloss on the various provisions of the stat- 
ute, seeks to reveal the features of that economy. 
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Running Away 
Isn't running away, punished in paragraph 1, running like hell for the 
rear, precisely how we visualize the purest cowardice (punished in paragraph 5), 
just as casting away arms (punished in paragraph 4) so you could run away faster 
was how Plato and Aristotle envisioned it?5 In fact, the very vividness of the image 
of running away has led some defendants to prefer being charged with the vaguer 
and more abstract cowardice under paragraph 5, considering it less prejudicial than 
an accusation of running away.6 But statutory provisions that to the normal eye look 
duplicative will inspire interpreters to invent differentiating glosses, just as language 
itself, though needing all kinds of structural and particular redundancies, never 
quite allows a perfect synonym. So paragraph 5 cowardice was read to require 
a showing of fear as a necessary element of the offense.7 Cowardice had to be moti- 
vated by fear or it was not cowardice, but running away, it was decided, did not need 
to be so motivated. This strikes normal people, nonlawyers, that is, as somewhat 
perverse. Why else would anyone flee battle, run away, if not in panic or terror or 
out of simpler fears of death and mayhem? 
The military judges struggled to give running away a meaning that would dis- 
tinguish it from cowardice. They wanted to avoid defining running away so expan- 
sively as to undo the mercy implicit in differently defined and lesser offenses uch 
as "absent without leave," those acts of desertion that did not take place in the 
presence of the enemy.8 One military court became the final word on the subject 
with this desperate attempt: 
This term [runs away] must connote some form of fleeing from an ensuing or impending 
battle.... it appears that to limit he phrase to flight from fear or cowardice is too restricted. 
It would appear to be more in keeping with the offense, ifan intent o avoid combat, with 
its attending hazards and dangers is considered as an essential part of running away.9 
'An intent to avoid combat" seems to be a catchall for whatever motives other than 
fear might prompt a soldier to run away. What precisely might these motives be? 
One could, I suppose, run away out of treachery, or out of the most calculating thin- 
lipped prudence,10 or out of love, as the humane Abner Small supposes, in the case 
of the deserters he was asked to round up on home leave back in Maine in 1863: 
"My sympathies, I admit, were often moved for deserters whose love of family was 
apparently stronger than their love of country. They weren't running away; they 
were merely going home." II 
But the narrative suggested by each one of these motives seems incomplete 
without complementing them with fear of death. The most psychologically plausi- 
ble motive for running away that dispenses with such fear is fleeing in disgust, sick 
at being stuck in a situation where so much is asked of you and so little given you 
in return; not fear, but the feeling of being ripped off, revolted by unfairness and 
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injustice. But such a person does not run away; the image is wrong, even the notion 
of fleeing misrepresents the insolence, even the fearlessness, with which he walks, 
sullenly saunters, but manifestly does not run away, while muttering, "fuck this." 
But the court doesn't offer us a picture of sullen withdrawal. Still desperate, the 
judges turn to William Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents where he too evinces 
bafflement, and in good legal form provides authority for his bafflement by citing 
an older writer who was discussing something not precisely on point: 
RUNNING AWAY This is merely a form of misbehavior before the enemy, and the words 
"runs away" might well be omitted from the Article as surplusage. Barker, an old writer 
cited by Samuel, says of this offense: "But here it is to be noted that of fleeing there be two 
sorts; the one proceeding of a sudden and unlooked for terror, which is least blameable; the 
other is voluntary, and, as it were, a determinate intention to give place unto the enemy 
a fault exceeding foule and not excusable.12 
The court citing Winthrop citing E. Samuel (early nineteenth century) citing Rob- 
ert Barker (late sixteenth century) distinguishes two types of fleeing, the first "pro- 
ceeding of a sudden and unlooked for terror" and the second of "a determinate 
intention. "13 Barker considers this first kind of flight the "least blameable," re- 
minding us that, in normal life, we sometimes are willing to excuse one who com- 
mits his offense in a panic. We may even be tempted to say that panic-stricken 
conduct is involuntary, something for which we cannot hold the actor accountable. 
To be sure, suddenness hardly precludes volition (when I flee in panic I am still 
voluntarily quitting the field), but Barker is right to notice that our ordinary ideas 
about culpability distinguish between the offender who coldly calculates, the pic- 
ture of self-interested prudence itself, and the one who offends while in the grip of 
terror or some other strong passion. 14 The distinction Barker is making is also likely 
to capture the difference in culpability of the first man to flee from those who follow 
infected by his contagion. But the statute does nothing to incorporate Barker's dis- 
tinction; the statute catches in its lethal sweep the cold calculator and the panicked 
wreck, whether under paragraph 1 or 5. 
Panic, one suspects, is treated more leniently by Barker because it is impractical 
to do otherwise, not just as a concession to ideas of mens rea or culpability. Panic 
usually involves large numbers in headlong flight and however harmful its conse- 
quences it hardly makes sense to hand over the entire army to the firing squad. 
Let them make amends by regrouping and fighting better another day. Barker's 
distinction between "exceeding foule" flight of "determinate intention" and less 
blameworthy panicked flight follows immediately upon his discussion of Roman 
decimation, the practice of killing by lot one in ten of a failed legion. This associa- 
tion suggests that decimation might be suitable in the case of generalized panic- 
propelled fleeing, but that fully individualized punishment, rated at 1.0 probability 
rather than at the 0.1 discounted group rate, should be meted out to the voluntary 
calculator of his own immediate best interests. 
A prosecution brought under paragraph 5, cowardly conduct, must show, as 
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noted, that the conduct was motivated by fear. This is one of the few areas in the 
law where the decision maker is asked actually to find that the person was motivated 
by a particular passion, not just to find that the person was in the sway of some 
generalized powerful passion. How do we prove that fear was the motive? Do cer- 
tain bodily clues betray him? Was he pale, did he tremble, sweat, shed tears, urinate 
or defecate in his pants? Even if so, such bodily indicators are ambiguous. Heat too 
makes us sweat, while joy, grief, and the cold may make us shed tears. The most 
lethal saga hero of ancient Iceland grew pale in anger, not in fear. Michel de Mon- 
taigne observes that both "extreme cowardice and extreme bravery disturb the 
stomach and are laxative." Even the nickname "The Trembler," he notes, given as 
an honorific to King Garcia V of Navarre, "serves as a reminder that boldness can 
make your limbs shake just as much as fear.""5 Dysentery can cause us to befoul 
ourselves. And the fear of getting caught with one's pants down often leads the 
soldier, at least in the trenches of World War I, to become desperately constipated. 16 
Fear does have a distinctive facial expression but the expression can be suppressed 
when one is scared and faked when one isn't. 
This is not earth-shattering news. State of mind always ends up being inferred 
either by legal convention or by the social knowledge necessary to make sense of 
whatever act or omission whose motivation we seek. If one is in a battle and trembles 
and runs away, or cries while curled up in a fetal position and hence cannot advance, 
then we judge that behavior to be a consequence of fear, and so confident are we 
of our judgment that we would not believe anyone who behaved in such manner 
and said he was not fearful. 
In peace the law of duress assumes that fear is excusing; in the military fear is 
incriminating." In the civilian world one who succumbs to fear may plead duress 
to avoid criminal liability, but in battle the soldier may not succumb to fear unless 
a substantial number of his fellows give in at the same time. If he is the only one 
(or one of few) who gives way we judge him to be of insufficient firmness and thus 
culpable. In cases of common-law duress the defendant is measured against a norm 
whose constraint on actual behavior is hypothesized by figuring what the "reason- 
able man" would do under like circumstances, but in battle the norm is situated 
concretely: we know whether most held firm, or whether most didn't. If most didn't 
they are all off the hook, for we do not, in the Roman style, cast lots and decimate 
the battalion.18 
Gentle Offense vs. Craven Defense 
Fear has been read in as an element only in the specific charge of cow- 
ardice in paragraph 5. But it is also the psychological and social eminence grise in 
other provisions. Paragraph 2 deals with the shameful abandonment or surrender 
of men, a position, or material; paragraph 8 deals with the willful failure to do one's 
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utmost to encounter the enemy. Paragraph 8 can be seen as the failure to give cause 
to the enemy to violate their version of paragraph 2; that is, the most desired out- 
come of your aggressive moves is to cause the enemy to abandon shamefully what 
it is their duty to defend. The "shamefully" explicitly makes this a moral issue, as 
well as a legal one. Paragraph 2 involves the kind of mettle needed to defend prop- 
erly, paragraph 8 the kind needed to offend or attack. And although we understand 
failures under each provision to involve cowardice, it is not clear that these coward- 
ices carry the same moral weight or are understood in quite the same way. 
Courage on defense seems to demand a different mix of virtues and talents 
than does courage on offense, and it may be that cowardice also varies with the 
different styles of courage demanded. We can, I think, imagine someone who is 
perfectly courageous when attacked, who will not flee, who will even die before 
abandoning the fight, who at the same time does not have the ability to initiate 
violence, who, if not quite a mass of quivering jelly, may tend to find too many 
reasons, with all the trappings of an admirable prudence, why it would not be in 
anyone's best interests to go over the top: a slacker. A person constituted like this 
would not strike us as a psychological impossibility. In fact Ulysses S. Grant com- 
plained that such was exactly the problem with one of his generals G. K. Warren: 
Warren was able to see "every danger at a glance," too many dangers apparently 
and he delayed moving until he had made exacting preparations for each of them 
with the result that he never got to his appointed place in time to coordinate with 
others. But still "there was no officer more capable, nor one more prompt in acting, 
than Warren wzhen the enemyforced him to it" (emphasis supplied). 19 Nor is the obverse 
unimaginable: someone brave in the attack, but cowardly in defense. Some have 
suggested that this describes Mike Tyson's moral failure in his fights with Evander 
Holyfield, who, when his ominous aggressiveness failed to cow the opponent, either 
folded sullenly or folded violently but in such a way that announced he was quitting 
the field. Aristotle may have had such a type in mind in his rather implausible 
portrait of the rash man, who turns cowardly the moment he experiences any 
real resistance.20 
Consider a special kind offailure on offense described by Abner Small, a Union 
officer, recalling the battle at Fredericksburg, in which Federal troops were massa- 
cred as they charged repeatedly over open ground against Confederate guns and 
soldiers safely placed behind stone fences, a kind of Union anticipation of Pickett's 
charge or of the horror of 1 July 1916 on the Somme: 
I wondered then, and I wonder now equally, at the mystery of bravery. Itseemed to me, as 
I saw men facing death at Fredericksburg, that they were heroes or cowards in spite of them- 
selves. In the charge I saw one soldier falter epeatedly, bowing as if before a hurricane. He 
would gather himself together, gain his place in the ranks, and again drop behind. Once or 
twice he fell to his knees, and at last he sank to the ground, still gripping his musket and 
bowing his head. I lifted him to his feet and said, "Coward!" It was cruel, it was wicked; 
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but I failed to notice his almost agonized effort to command himself. I repeated the bitter 
word, "Coward!" His pale, distorted face flamed. He flung at me, "You lie!" Yet he didn't 
move; he couldn't; his legs would not obey him. I left him there in the mud. Soon after the 
battle he came to me with tears in his eyes and said, 'Adjutant, pardon me, I couldn't go 
on; but I'm not a coward." Pardon him! I asked his forgiveness.2' 
This passage is remarkable not just for the substantial iterary talent it reveals but 
also for the penitent self-understanding of its author, an officer, who has the moral 
courage to beg forgiveness of one of his men who cannot bear the disgrace of one 
interpretation of his failure to advance. This is also an account of weak legs, one 
of many that could be culled from war memoirs and courts martial, with all the 
particular moral ambiguity that such cases reveal. The soldier's spirit, it seems, was 
willing, but his flesh was weak. His body just would not respond to the dedication 
of his will to do the right thing, to go forward. That is one view of the matter: the 
soldier's view it seems. There are other ways of looking at it. 
Weak legs are a near unfathomable mystery. It is the mind-body problem in 
spades, not as an intellectual exercise, but sadly offering this soldier his most 
dignity-preserving defense. Without a convincing account of mind and body, emo- 
tion and body, conscious and unconscious, we do not know how to apportion blame 
between body and will. Though this soldier's fear may be generated unconsciously 
by brain processes that are old enough evolutionarily to be available even to reptiles, 
he also has self-consciousness, and we cannot read his weak legs without paying 
heed to his own view of what happened to himself. His own bewilderment, anguish, 
and frustration with his will's inability to effect his conscious good desire to acquit 
himself well is not quite the same as the classic case of weakness of will, in which 
the will is without means to overcome conscious bad desires. All his conscious de- 
sires are proper. 
Here the will is undone by we know not what. Unconscious desires to flee? Or 
something more primitive than desire, pure automatic freeze reflex? Or does he 
will his weak legs but deceive himself into thinking he has willed otherwise? Are 
weak legs a peculiarly male form of hysteria? Surely some instances resemble classic 
cases of hysteria, as when the legs give way when ordered to attack, but remain 
hysterically paralyzed as part of more generalized shell-shock, combat stress, orjust 
plain cracking up.22 Might he know he fears and intends to indicate that he does 
not ratify his fear, that he means to move on in spite of it and is desperately ashamed 
that an undesired desire for safety is causing his body to defeat his desired desire 
to move forward? To his mind he is not a coward, even though he couldn't go on. 
Most cowards' legs remain quite serviceable for running away, but this man's legs 
do not let him flee either. Cowards flee, not him; he just can't go forward: "I'm not 
a coward," he says with vehement conviction. 
Whom or what to blame, whom or what to understand, excuse, pardon, or 
convict? Major Small's own theory varies with the exigencies of the setting, and no 
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doubt ours would too. In the heat of battle Small is not generously disposed toward 
the shaken soldier. In battle Small's interests are such that he must hold the soldier 
strictly liable for the poor performance of his legs, whatever the source of their weak- 
ness. He has just grounds for suspicion, for weak legs are so easy to fake. Small's 
man proves the sincerity of his excuse, however, but only once the battle is over and 
Small has time and quiet to ponder the mysteries of courage and cowardice is he 
willing to accept the excuse. The soldier not only now sheds tears of frustration, 
contrition, and shame, but he had also rebuffed his officer's accusation as a man of 
honor would: he gave Small the lie, the traditional manly challenge to a duel upon 
an accusation of cowardice. The poor man means well in the aftermath and Small's 
lack of certainty as to the psychological and physiological components of weak legs 
incline him toward lenience and thus toward believing the soldier meant well on 
the field of battle too. The statute punishing "willful failure to engage" the enemy 
follows Small in giving some credence to a weak-legs defense, for weak legs are not 
understood to occur willfully. If there was a mutiny it was of the legs, not of the 
will. He will be spared the firing squad. Though he can't help his weak legs he may 
still be in the martial world a coward, but in the more nuanced judgment of one 
civil war soldier "a good coward," one who tried hard to stick it out, though in the 
end he ran away every time.23 
Weak legs figure in soldiers' accounts as an insistent motif, seeming to stand as 
the emblem for the many kinds of fracturing that battle works on the unity of sense 
and sensibility, but mostly it stands for the split between mind and body. The body 
just goes its own way and the soldier looks on in dismay. This is the body that befouls 
the soldier's pants during shelling or in the midst of a charge; this is the body that 
sheds tears, sweats, faints, and even instinctively feints. This also may be the same 
perverse body that thwarts male desire, as well as male will, as when a man "can't 
get it up," a case of a weak leg if ever there was one. The same body figures in 
diverse and often ambivalent ways in how we talk about courage and cowardice: 
courage is heart, cowardice losing heart; courage is nerve, cowardice nerves; it takes 
guts to go forward, but the same guts cramp in agony or explode in diarrhea. And 
when courage is playing on disgust's home turf rather than on fear's it takes "stom- 
ach," not guts, to overcome the horror. 
Like guts, legs play both sides of the fence; they are as likely to do their duty 
against a desire to fold as they are to fold against a desire to stay the course. Thus 
men march asleep, stand at their posts though asleep on their feet; the soldier would 
prefer to fall out of line, but his legs keep going with a will of their own. One of 
Tim O'Brien's characters in GoingAfter Cacciato can consciously resolve to fall down, 
yet have his legs refuse to obey "the decision did not reach his legs."24 Then there 
are the cases, often medal-winning cases, of those who fight on despite failed and 
very weak legs, who manage to continue when their legs have been mangled by 
mines or even severed by shells. Winner of a posthumous Medal of Honor, Private 
Herbert Christian, in action in Italy in 1944, had his right leg severed above the 
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knee by cannon fire, but continued to "advance on his left knee and the bloody 
stump of his right thigh, firing his sub-machinegun," killing three of the enemy 
and thereby rescuing twelve of his comrades. He continued forward for another 
twenty yards to within ten yards of the enemy position where he killed "a machine 
pistol man" before he finally succumbed.25 
Irony is at the core of weak legs in all its manifestations; the body makes ajoke 
out of our disembodied aspirations, and those aspirations repay the favor by making 
the body into a bit ofjoke itself. From the conventional case in which legs give out 
against the will of their owner, to the unconventional case in which they don't give 
out even when they are no longer there, Irony smirks from above or from wherever 
Irony has its mythic home. Weak legs are the governing explanatory force in inci- 
dents in which they have been metamorphosed almost beyond recognition. Robert 
Graves's dark eye gives us this account: 
So [Captain] Samson charged with "C" and the remainder of "B" Company.... When 
his platoon had gone about twenty ards, he signalled them to lie down and open covering 
fire. The din was tremendous. He saw the platoon on his left flopping down too, so he whis- 
tled the advance again. Nobody seemed to hear. He jumped up from his shell-hole, waved 
and signalled "Forward!" 
Nobody stirred. 
He shouted: "You bloody cowards, are you leaving me to go on alone?" 
His platoon-sergeant, groaning with a broken shoulder gasped: "Not cowards, Sir. Will- 
ing enough. But they're all fucking dead." The Pope's Nose machine-gun, traversing, had 
caught them as they rose to the whistle.26 
This case is almost perfectly congruent with Small's confrontation with his weak- 
legged soldier. The commanding officer finds his men unable to go forward; they, 
through a spokesman this time for obvious reasons, testify that they are not cow- 
ards; indeed they are as willing as can be ("Not cowards, Sir. Willing enough"), but 
being dead, their legs are simply unable to carry out their noble posthumous wishes. 
Weak legs, by hook or crook, come to explain the failure of most all failed charges. 
Death, in this bitterly comic tale, is merely a special and conclusive case of weak 
legs. 
Not just legs suffer from weakness; fingers get infected too. According to a well- 
known and very influential claim made by military historian General S. L. A. Mar- 
shall in 1946, only fifteen percent, and in any event no more than twenty-five p r- 
cent, of American World War II infantrymen ever fired their guns in battle, even 
once.27 Marshall's numbers may not be plausible and they have been strongly and 
convincingly disputed, but for our purposes it is sufficient simply to note the phe- 
nomenon as a form of weak legs, however extensive it may have been.28 These same 
men did not run, but they could not or would not fire, even, he claimed, when they 
were being overrun in banzai charges. They were "not malingerers ... They were 
there to be killed if the enemy fire searched and found them."29 
Marshall offers two main explanations; one is the standard case of weak legs: 
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"The failure of the average soldier to fire. . is the result of a paralysis which comes 
of varying fears."30 The other qualifies as weak legs too, but a very nonstandard 
case. In this explanation the idea is that people actually fear killing more than being 
killed. Your legs give out because you fear dying; your finger gives out because you 
fear killing. What do you expect, asks Marshall, after socializing our citizens in 
nonaggressiveness and in the value of human life: " [His upbringing] stays his trig- 
ger finger even though he is hardly conscious that it is a restraint upon him.... At 
the vital point, he becomes a conscientious objector, unknowing.'3' A colleague of 
mine who fought as a second lieutenant at T-Bone Hill in Korea offers another 
explanation, which Marshall dismisses: The soldier who doesn't fire at the enemy, 
he says, holds the magical belief that his kindness will be reciprocated.32 
This same colleague raised another matter relevant to our theme. Weak legs 
may be the only way of raising the white flag on offense. When I asked him about 
his fears going up the hill he answered impatiently: "What the hell was I supposed 
to do? Raise a white flag on an assault? A cook or some rear-echelon guy can raise 
a white flag. But how do you raise a white flag in a charge?" Weak legs move in to 
fill the void raised by the comic incomprehensibility of surrendering as you go for- 
ward in an attack. 
Cowardice on defense seems more craven than cowardice on offense. Our im- 
age is of begging not to be killed, turning tail and running, or simply despairing and 
not just not fighting, as on offense, but not fighting back. Failure under paragraph 2 
or 8 is cowardly, and hence shameful, but only one offender, the miscreant defender, 
is branded shameful. Why the difference? There are several possible reasons. One 
involves the different stakes between losing as a defender and not measuring up as 
an aggressor. In the paradigm case we understand that the failure to defend means 
losing all; whereas the weakness on offense means you go home with your tail be- 
tween your legs. But there is a home to return to. We are all expected to defend 
what is ours, our property and our loved ones. Consider too the almost ridiculous 
obviousness of this statement: the moral demand to defend to the utmost is greater 
than the moral demand to attack or aggress to the utmost. Even in aggressive honor- 
based cultures that is true. However fearful you are, you must defend, but no one 
expects everyone to volunteer to be the forlorn hope, the first hrough the breach 
in the wall. And as a psychological matter, we tend to find losses of what is already 
ours much more grievous than failures to acquire an equivalent amount of what is 
not ours. 
The defender doesn't have the same kinds of choices the aggressor has or as 
many, for the latter is the moving party. It is aggressors who get to choose the timing 
and locate the battle on the defender's turf. The defender has no choice but to resist, 
even though he has some choices about how to carry this out: sometimes he must 
fight pitched battles, but other options are available. The Russians, for instance, 
have let the vastness of their land defeat invaders until it was safe to assume an 
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offensive posture; others have worn their attackers down with pesky gnatlike resis- 
tance, as Fabius did to Hannibal. But we should also note that Fabius had to muster 
great reserves of moral courage to persevere in the face of being thought cowardly 
by his countrymen for not engaging more aggressively.33 Gnatlike resistance, 
though effective in the end, may in certain warrior cultures not look manly enough 
to preempt accusations of poltroonery. The prudent warrior must always endure 
suspect glances and innuendoes about his fearfulness and lack of nerve. The statute 
may capture some little bit of that mistrust of the good faith of justifications for 
retreat and surrender, holding the defender of hearth and home to a higher moral 
standard than the weak-legged attacker. The paradigm we see embedded in the 
statute of invading aggressor versus the defenders of the homeland grants the 
attacker other options; it even allows him to plead weak legs from time to time, but 
the defender's legs must stand firm. And maybe too we seem to feel that we have 
more right to ask legs to stand still than to move forward, by which ruse we simply 
restate the differing moral stakes in not defending as opposed to not offending. 
Throwing Away One's Weapons 
The proscription against casting aside one's arms has a long tradition. 
It is a triumph of the grim literalism that often characterizes law that this provision, 
paragraph 4, wouldn't be understood to be implicit in paragraphs 2 (shameful 
abandonment of a position), 5 (cowardice), and especially 1 (running away). Run- 
ning away, except as perversely understood by the military courts, and casting away 
one's weapons, as I noted earlier, are both meant to capture the quintessence of 
martial cowardice: headlong panicked, sauve-qui-peut flight: 
Well, what if some barbaric Thracian glories 
in the perfect shield I left under a bush? 
I was sorry to leave it but I saved my skin. 
Does it matter? 0 hell, I'll buy a better one.34 
The comic energy of Archilochus's little song is parasitical on the power of the 
norms he so gleefully confesses to violating. The wit of such self-mockery, at such 
brazen shamelessness, is only possible because the norm against running away and 
debarrassing oneself of one's burdensome shield demands some kind of psychic 
homage even when not adhered to.35 But there is another kind of heroic inversion 
that takes place here. To be this cheerfully a coward in a warrior culture may itself 
mimic courage: such unapologetic shamelessness requires a certain kind of fearless- 
ness, as Aristotle recognized.36 This is the fearlessness that informs what we might 
vulgarly call the "I-don't-give-a-shit-what-they-think" attitude in matters touching 
upon reputation, an attitude as unfathomable to most of us as is the berserk courage 
of the kind that we associate with Alexander the Great. In keeping with his per- 
versely inverted courage Archilochus refuses even to allege fear as the reason for 
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casting away his shield. It is all a matter of rational choice. His weapons, as he 
observes, are completely replaceable, something he is quite pleased to believe is not 
the case with himself And although Archilochus knows he will have to fight again 
(that is one of the risks that running away does not completely resolve unless he is 
capitally punished for it), there is not the least hint he will do better next time. 
Archilochus's wit also reveals that virtue funds a powerful comedic impulse 
dedicated to deflating virtue's own pretentiousness and goody-two-shoes piety. Ar- 
chilochus's comedy celebrates a life-affirming world of very unrigorous virtue, what 
somber professors of virtue might even call vice. Life-affirming affability, as unrig- 
orous a virtue as we might find, is not a trait we think of as likely to describe the 
hero as it does the amiable hedonist, who means well and even does well as long as 
life or limb are not at stake, who prefers to keep fear safely relegated to worries 
about whether the sauce is sufficiently piquant to satisfy his guest's palate. Yet unlike 
the other cardinal and theological virtues, courage thrives in certain restricted co- 
medic veins. It is notjust the butt of the comedic; in some cultural settings the heroic 
style means to be funny with the nasty in-your-face mordancy of gallows humor. 
Here the mockery is not directed against the virtue of courage at all, but against 
all arguments that would undermine it, such as life itself 
With Archilochus compare the keen comedic eye of this confederate soldier 
running away to beat hell at Sharpsburg: 
Oh, how I ran! Or tried to run through the high corn, for my heavy belt and cartridge box 
and musket kept me back to half my speed. I was afraid of being struck in the back, and I 
frequently turned half around in running, so as to avoid if possible so disgraceful a wound. 
It never entered my head to throw away gun or cartridge box; but, encumbered as I was, I 
endeavored to keep pace with my captain, who with his long legs and unencumbered would 
in a little while have far outstripped me but that he frequently turned towards the enemy, 
and, running backwards, managed not to come out ahead in this our anything but credit- 
able race.37 
John Dooley, our soldier, runs his anything but creditable race desperately aware 
of the comedy of trying to maintain the appearance of honor in headlong retreat: 
don't get shot in the back if you can help it and don't throw away your arms, al- 
though you realize that they have less than zero value to you now, pure dead weight. 
Dooley is a wit after a fashion. He is not unaware of a kind of double competition 
with his captain, one to see who can get away the fastest and the other to see who 
can get away the slowest. He envies his captain's benefits of rank: no pack, they are 
in a wagon somewhere, and no rifle. By this time the weapons of officers are becom- 
ing symbolic indicia of rank, like the pistols, whistles, and walking stick of the Brit- 
ish officers who led their men into no-man's-land in the Great War. The ambiva- 
lence in the account and in the action itself gives the comedy multiple layers. 
The heroic ideal of standing your ground at all costs turns out to give way before 
fear and not an altogether irrational fear, though, as with Archilochus, the fear is 
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not mentioned directly but supplied by the comic action, giving it its motivating 
force. Both John Dooley and his captain are still giving respect to the norms they 
are not quite living up to by adhering to some of their forms: John will not throw 
away his gun or ammunition although by denying the thought ever entered his 
head he is merely saying that he resisted a temptation that had indeed entered his 
head and both he and his captain engage in the farce of trying to prevent the 
ignominy of being shot in the back by running backwards every now and then. 
It is the comic voice with its almost self-delighting self-mockery that indicates 
this is not culpable cowardice. The comedy is probably the surest sign that Dooley 
and Archilochus are not alone in flight. The whole army is in a rout. This is a pure 
case of running away to live to fight another day as long, that is, as they do not 
throw their weapons away. Dooley's attempts to maintain the forms of honor indi- 
cate quite well that he means to be back. Even Archilochus means to return with 
his new shield, but by throwing his old one away he commits an offense that Dooley 
may have wanted to commit, but his implicit contest with his captain to see who 
could minimize their mutual dishonor kept him honest. Archilochus, however, does 
more than just disarm himself, he arms the opposition. 
From the military's point of view, casting aside arms is a very serious matter. It 
renders the soldier useless; it arms the opposition, and in societies in which the work 
and material that is congealed into the weapon represents the most valuable objects 
in the culture, throwing away weapons was culpable waste, even sacrilege. But non- 
military moralists take a kindlier view: Thomas Aquinas was willing to find the 
soldier who cast away his shield less sinful than the licentious man, because "grave 
fear and sorrow especially in dangers of death, stun the human mind, but not so 
pleasure which is the motive of intemperance."38 But Thomas might also be under- 
estimating the deliberative capacity of the weapon dropper. Dooley deliberately 
refrained from casting his aside; others might deliberately do so, for they might 
reason that an unarmed man might look like a noncombatant and thus fade by 
degrees into a general population, a plausible motive before uniforms made a gen- 
eral appearance in the late seventeenth century. 
False Alarms 
Paragraph 7 punishes capitally the person who causes false alarms, and 
it must be seen as the companion of paragraph 3, which punishes the person who 
"through disobedience [or] neglect ... endangers the safety of command, unit, [or] 
place." One provision sets limits on jitteriness, the hyperalertness and excessive 
imagination that, if not quite inventing danger, overrates its imminence; the other 
seeks to limit the lack ofjitteriness, the lack of imagination or insensibility that lets 
the sentry fall asleep on his watch. Falling asleep on the watch is a strict liability 
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offense. It does not matter that you didn't mean to. And the same is the case for 
causing false alarms. There are no requirements in the provision that one cause 
them knowingly or intentionally and no cases have held that such requirements are 
to be implied.39 It is not only the prankster that set off the fire alarms in junior high 
that the law can put before the firing squad, but the nervous wreck, the poor high- 
strung, anxious soul, who suffers from being too alert to the prospect of danger and 
has not managed to develop the cool or the expertise that distinguishes between the 
general danger of being in the presence of the enemy from the particular imminent 
danger that requires immediate and total mobilization of one's resources. This poor 
soul does not feel the difference between the state of daily alertness to the possibility 
of alarm on the one hand and being alarmed on the other, between normal vigi- 
lance and the sense that something indeed is up. For we suspect that this is an imagi- 
native soul and much too sensitive. Risk to him is not a probabilistic assessment, 
but certain danger. His lot is constant insomnia and nausea. 
This type of false alarmist, however, may also be the very man who is asleep 
at his post. Given that for him there is no distinguishing between the various levels 
of danger or its imminence, sleep, never easy to achieve under the best of circum- 
stances, might just as well come at one anxiety-ridden time as another.40 But we 
usually think of the sleeping sentry as utterly opposed to the false alarmist, as a 
study in insensibility, an anxietyless person for whom sleep has always been easy. 
And it is for this reason alone that he is simultaneously an object of the nervous 
insomniac's envy and his contempt. 
The sleeping sentry and false alarmist contrast in other ways. As a purely Dar- 
winian matter the species needs an alarm system that engenders some false positives 
or it wouldn't be sensitive nough. A system that gave no false positives would have 
left us all in the viscera of our predators or slaves of our more sensitive nemies. But 
an alarm system too responsive would, as Erving Goffman noted, have us spending 
all our time in dither and not in grazing, digesting, sleeping, playing, or whatever 
we need to do to survive.4' This is why we divide the labor; the sentry is to be 
vigilant so that the rest can sleep. We want our sentry to be experienced and cool, 
but not insensitive or dull. We need him alert, or if not alert, alertable by all those 
signs that, if we lived in a movie, would be accompanied by ominous music. 
The false alarmist and sleeping sentry impose costs in different ways. The false 
alarmist runs up the bill each time he occasions a false alarm. To the obvious costs 
of wasted energy spent mobilizing, the physiological costs of misused adrenaline, 
missummoned fear, and loss of sleep should be added the disclosure of one's posi- 
tions to the enemy by the mobilization or merely by the panicked firing into the 
threatening night. But the greatest cost is that false alarms lead to mistrusting the 
next true alarm. And although we may recoup some of these costs by the disbelief 
of futurefalse alarms, that would be a penny-wise and pound-foolish accounting, 
for the alarm would not be disbelieved because false, but disbelieved because of the 
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belief that all alarms are more likely to be false than true. Such a belief leaves one 
effectively without a functioning alarm system. The jittery false alarmist, after all, 
does not mean to be false, and in other settings his sensitivity may be a most valuable 
asset. True, its value suffers erious diminution if he is not right most of the time. 
And if he were right most of the time we would consider him a man of experience 
and discernment, not a jittery pathetic wreck whom we can imagine putting up 
before the firing squad. 
If the false alarmist imposes serious costs each time he blows it, that is not the 
case with the sleeping sentry. His sleep imposes harm if the attack occurs on his 
watch, otherwise his sleep, though negligent or even reckless, yields no great harm. 
But not quite. If others suspect he is asleep or know he is asleep, then they must 
increase their vigilance to compensate. Their anxiety levels rise and they begin to 
expend energy in dither that could have better been spent relaxing. The sentry 
functions in the way catastrophe insurance functions. Most days go by without our 
having gained much for carrying such insurance except the ease of mind having it 
confers. The sentry provides such insurance. He is meant to allow others to rest 
secure in the belief that his eyes and ears are just as serviceable at the moment as 
theirs would be. 
To the extent that insensibility produces fearlessness it may be very useful in 
the midst of combat either on attack or in defense. But in the myriad of soldiers' 
memoirs I have been plowing through fear is not the only psychically and morally 
destructive motion that threatens oldierliness. Fear dominates in battle or in im- 
mediate anticipation of it; but soldiers do more than fight. They also stand and wait. 
Boredom defeats almost as many soldiers as fear. If fear defeats our false alarmist, 
boredom defeats our sleeping sentry, so bored he cannot generate the imagination 
to fear the consequences of his boredom. 
Omnipotent Fear 
No one doubts that soldiers are afraid.42 There have been, through time, 
different views as to whether it was acceptable for them to admit openly that they 
were, but fear was clearly always a gloomy and tormenting omnipresence. Those 
few who qualify as genuine berserks aside, the dominant passion in battle, the one 
each party expects its comrades and its opponents to be intimately involved with, 
is fear. We might see all heroic literature as a desperate attempt to keep it at bay. 
One pays homage to it by working hard to deny it in oneself and to insult one's 
opponent with it. Agamemnon has images of Terror and Panic painted on the sides 
of his shield.43 Before the battle of Gaugamala Alexander sacrificed to Fear. Beowulf 
drinks and boasts the night before seeking out Grendel to raise the moral stakes of 
failure. Even Achilles, if not quite fearful, doesn't dare fight without armor as some 
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of the Norse berserks would do. And Alexander again, who was surely a berserk in 
combat and feared no one in the host arrayed opposite him, nor the whole host for 
that matter, was still rather paranoid at times about suspected plots against his life 
from within his own ranks. (There is an interesting idea to pursue here: the different 
issues raised for the demands on our courage by our fear of enemies as opposed to 
our fear of friends. And this would hardly be solved by the fiat of declaring that our 
friends are those whom we do not fear.) 
Commanders have always assumed the fearfulness of their soldiers. The sub- 
tlest observer of all, Thucydides, noticed the tendency of battle lines to extend by 
degrees to the right so that each army slowly flanked its opponent's left as it too 
moved to its right: "This is because fear makes every man want to do his best to 
find protection for his unarmed side in the shield of the man next to him on the 
right, thinking that the more closely shields are locked together, the safer he will 
be."44 Exhortation speeches try to counter fear and reluctance with other passions: 
revenge, perhaps, anger, confidence, bloodlust, and often, in extremis, desperation. 
But no commander trusted to mere words. The Persians whipped their men to bat- 
de; many a general used his cavalry to deter his fleeing troops more than to engage 
the enemy. One military theoretician, Raimondo Montecuccoli, a general on the 
Imperial side in the Thirty Years War, spent the bulk of his treatise on how to delay 
just long enough the natural cowardice of one's own troops to give sufficient time 
for the natural cowardice of the troops on the other side to assert itself. He lists 
some of the devices one may use to keep one's men on the field: let the enemy cut 
off lines of retreat (!), forbid the inhabitants of nearby friendly cities from admitting 
any of the troops, dig trenches behind your troops, burn bridges and ships, delegate 
certain men to shoot retreating soldiers.45 When arraying the troops and forming 
their lines, Montecuccoli advises embedding the cowards in the middle of the ranks 
behind the valorous ones, whom they can follow at less risk to themselves, and 
hemmed in by the ranks behind them.46 
One can also combat fear by instilling confidence, he notes. Nor does it mat- 
ter that that confidence is ultimately indistinguishable from those crude self- 
deceptions that actually on occasion do succeed in bootstrapping us into per- 
forming better than we have any right to expect. "One may conceal or change the 
name of the enemy general if he happens to have a great reputation." Confidence 
can also be acquired by stimulating contempt for the enemy by 
presenting naked prisoners to the soldier. Once they have viewed the captives' fragile, flabby, 
filthy, diseased, and infirm legs, as well as their hardly valiant arms, then men will have no 
reason to be afraid, for they will have had the chance to see the kind of people with whom 
they must fight namely, pusillanimous, humble, and tearful individuals. 
While cowards like me and a good portion of my readers may find in this display 
additional reason to desert or flee rather than fight to the death, Montecuccoli 
thinks otherwise: 
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Indeed, the troops may come to fear the state of bondage themselves once they have per- 
ceived the wretched fate of such afflicted, shackled, castigated, and emaciated persons, and 
they may conclude that it will be better to fall in battle rather than, dragging on their lives 
unhappily, necessarily experience such contumely and calamity.47 
Our statute authorizes the killing of cowards, slackers, craven defenders, and 
jittery false alarmists and supposes to dissuade these behaviors by taking from them 
exactly what they sought to save: their lives. The statute testifies to the power of fear 
as a motivator: make them fear the court martial as much as they fear the enemy. 
This is probably not the wisest strategy since it gives the soldier no reason, once the 
crunch is on, to prefer one outcome to the other; and it loses all its force should he 
fear the enemy more. Moreover, it is not uncommon that the coward in battle faces 
the firing squad with dignity and courage. Such was the case with Eddie Slovik, 
who spent his last moments trying to alleviate the anxiety of those who had to exe- 
cute him. The fear that motivates cowardice may be not only the fear of death but 
the inability to suffer Death's malicious teasing. Certain death, whether by suicide 
or firing squad, may be a kind of relief, a good-bye to all that. 
The statute also hints of another motivating fear; it is the fear of being dis- 
graced as a coward, the fear of shame. This is hardly a startling revelation. It is a 
commonplace, the theme of honor itself, which demands that fear of losing esteem 
and esteemability is worse than death. In this light the law can be seen not only as 
the scourge of those too shameless to be properly motivated by their sense of shame 
but also as a bit player in backing the norms that support the sense of shame. The 
law then, though mostly negative in its means of motivating, also has a positive role 
to play in securing the behavior it desires. 
To conclude, reconsider the statute. One may wonder at the impossible stan- 
dard it sets. The soldier is to do his duty, but the duty demanded seems almost to 
be beyond the call of duty. It is as if the law asks that soldiers not only not be cowards, 
but that they be courageous as a matter of routine. But then consider briefly para- 
graph 9, the one provision we have left unnoticed until now. It governs, among 
other things, the obligation to rescue. In contrast to the heroic demands of the other 
provisions not to run, not to fail willfully to advance, not to abandon shamefully a
position, we move to the world of prudence: not to "afford all practicable relief" Of 
course, it doesn't make sense to throw good bodies after bad unless it is rational to 
do so. Presumably one must balance the likelihood of saving the endangered person 
against the risk incurred to save him plus some value assigned to the overall morale 
of fighting men who will fight harder for a polity that cares to rescue them. Still it 
was hardly irrational for the men charged with saving Private Ryan to question 
why eight of them should be risked to save someone whose only special claim to 
rescue was that he was the last survivor of four brothers.48 Yet even practicable and 
rational rescue hardly dispenses with the need for courage on the part of the 
rescuers. 
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It is precisely in the domain of rescue that twentieth-century battle has made 
its particular addition to the styles of the heroic. It is in the Great War that stretcher 
bearers get Victoria Crosses and in Vietnam that medics get their Medals of Honor. 
In the Civil War the same medal was more likely to be awarded for rescuing the 
regiment's colors. By setting our heroic stories in narratives of rescue are we argu- 
ing for a kinder styled heroic: selfless, fearless, and life-saving rather than life- 
destroying?49 Or is it that we see the medic, the stretcher bearer, as needing no 
special physical attributes, that they are everyman or indeed everywoman, that they 
hold for all of us the possibility of grand action, even if we do not have the body of 
Ajax or the spirit of Alexander or the ability to kill other human beings, even when 
it is in our best interests to do so?50 
But for most of us I would guess that what is most salient in this statute is not 
its substantive commitments o much as its formal attributes. For surely the statute's 
most remarkable feature is its redundancy, which in a statute that seeks to punish 
capitally becomes a redundancy of both literal and figurative overkill. Yes, the stat- 
ute excuses weak legs as long as the mind did not willfully collude with the body to 
produce them and puts no extraordinary demands on the rescuer, but it otherwise is 
quite clear about reserving the firing squad for cowardice motivated by fear, and, 
if that lets too many off the hook of culpability, it specifically includes the jittery 
alarmist, the person who turns tail for whatever motivation other than fear, the 
slack attacker, the person who casts away his weapons, the quiveringly craven de- 
fender, and the exuberant looter. 
The statute received its present form in 1950 when it was cobbled together from 
the Articles of War and the Articles for the Governance of the Navy into a Uniform 
Code of Military Justice. Most of the clauses were already extant in the British 
Articles of War of 1769, which in turn were enacted virtually verbatim as the rebel- 
lious colonies' articles of war of 1776. In them are found the strictures against loot- 
ing, shameful abandonment of a position, casting away arms, and causing false 
alarms but not the clauses against cowardice and failure to engage, that is, the weak- 
legs provision. Those have their origin in the navy articles.5' Weak legs turn out to 
be a certain kind of sea legs. Not that the army couldn't always get the weak-legged 
advancer under various general orders, but the navy was concerned less with the 
legs of its sailors, at least until they might have to board an enemy ship, than with 
the will of a captain to make his ship advance.52 The sailors could be standing on 
the deck with legs quivering and still be advancing because the sailor was being 
borne by a higher will, willy-nilly. The provision that I have been dealing with as 
a weak-leg provision is historically not about legs at all, but about a naval captain's 
weakness of will. 
One final observation about cobbling, statutory revision, and uniform laws in 
this world of uniforms: it was the modern reform, the modern consolidation of the 
articles providing a uniform law for all the armed services that produced the ar- 
chaic, casuistic, ad hoc absurdist look of the present statute, not the remnants of 
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pre-eighteenth-century diction still lingering about in shameful abandonments and 
the casting away of arms. It was the 1950 consolidators, that is the modernizers, 
that made this statute look more like a law of IEthelberht or IElfred than a law of 
the most advanced industrial power of the 1950 world. 
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